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Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: Why Does the Law Treat
Them Diﬀerently?
June M. Besek*

I. I
Pre-1972 sound recordings are treated diﬀerently under the law from other works of
authorship. For historical reasons, they are protected only under state law, not federal
copyright law, until 2067, when they will fall into the public domain.1 Because the scope
of rights and exceptions in these recordings varies from state to state, it is often diﬃcult
to make judgments about permissible uses. Moreover, as exploitation of sound recordings
moves from the sale of copies (or phonorecords, as they are referred to under federal
law) to streaming, pre-1972 sound recordings are increasingly deprived of the beneﬁts of
exploitation, for reasons discussed below.
These pre-1972 recordings cover a wide range of material. The commercial recordings
come most readily to mind including Louis Armstrong, Glen Miller, Frank Sinatra, Elvis
Presley, the Supremes, and many more jazz, classical, blues, folk and pop recordings, as
well as spoken word recordings such as audio books or lectures. But there are also many
recordings that were not made for commercial distribution and are technically unpublished,
such as archival copies of radio programs, oral histories, reporters’ notes, recordings made
for research on everything from bird calls to indigenous music, and so on. Some of these
recordings may have signiﬁcant commercial value; others have value only to researchers in
niche areas.
The U.S. Copyright Oﬃce has recommended that pre-1972 sound recordings be brought
under federal copyright law.2 Although such a move potentially raises issues of takings
Executive Director, Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts and Lecturer-in-Law, Columbia Law
School.
1. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (1998).
2. R
C
, U.S. C
O
,F
C
P
P -1972
S
R
(Dec. 2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/pre-72-report.pdf [hereinafter Copyright Oﬃce Report]. The author of this article served as a consultant to the U.S. Copyright Oﬃce in
connection with the Copyright Oﬃce Report.
*
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under the Fifth Amendment,3 most of these issues could be addressed by carefully drafting
the new statute. On balance, bringing pre-1972 sound recordings under federal law could
provide greater certainty and fairness to the use and exploitation of these works by right
holders, scholars and consumers.

II. B
A sound recording is a work that results from the ﬁxation of a series of musical, spoken
or other sounds, regardless of how embodied.4 A music CD, for example, is a sound
recording, as is the digital version of the same work on a hard drive. A sound recording can
embody two or more works – the ﬁxation of sounds and the underlying musical or literary
work(s). Each may be entitled to a separate copyright.
Sound recordings have been in existence for more than 150 years.5 Until 1972, sound
recordings were not eligible for protection under federal copyright law. This stemmed in
part from a 1908 case in which the Supreme Court held that piano rolls were not “copies”
of the underlying musical work, because the musical work could not be visually discerned
from the piano roll.6 One unfortunate consequence of this ruling was that the mechanical
means by which sound recordings were embodied could not serve as a copy for purposes
of ﬁxation, because one could not discern the sounds sought to be protected merely with
the senses. 7 Since ﬁxation is an essential element of copyright protection, that decision
presented an obstacle to federal copyright protection for sound recordings.8 Any copyright
protection that sound recordings enjoyed prior to 1972 stemmed from state laws.
In the 1960s and early 1970s, unauthorized copying of sound recordings became cheaper
and easier, and large scale commercial infringement became more common.9 In 1971
Congress was persuaded that federal copyright protection for sound recordings was urgent.10
3. The Fifth Amendment provides: “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. C
.
. V.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
5. Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at 50.
6. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), superseded by statute, Copyrights Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). See Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at 8.
7. This was explicitly changed in the 1976 Copyright Act; the law currently provides that a “copy” is a “material object[] . . . in which a work is ﬁxed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the
work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device. . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
8. See Barbara A. Ringer, Study No. 26: The Unauthorized Duplication of Sound Recordings, in S
.
O P
,T
,
C
C
.O
J
, 86 C
., C
L
R
, 4-7 (Comm. Print Feb. 1957), available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/studies/study26.pdf.
9. H.R. R . N . 92-487, at 2 (1971).
10. Id. at 4. In addition, certain Supreme Court decisions had cast doubt on the validity of state law protection. H.R. R . N . 92-487 2-3, 12-13.
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On October 15, 1971, Congress passed the Sound Recording Act, eﬀective February 15,
1972, which brought sound recordings into the Copyright Act on a going-forward basis.11 All
sound recordings created on or after that date became eligible for protection under federal
copyright law. All sound recordings created earlier remained under state law.
In 1976 Congress completed a comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act. It brought
all unpublished works of authorship under federal copyright law (previously the federal
copyright law protected only published works) to create a unitary system of copyright.12
Nevertheless, it left pre-1972 sound recordings under state law13. To ensure that these works
would not be protected indeﬁnitely into the future, Congress provided that states could
continue to protect pre-1972 sound recordings until the end of 2047, at which point all
protection for these pre-1972 sound recordings would cease – in other words, they would
never be entitled to federal protection.14 This deadline was later extended to 2067.15

III. F

P

S

R

Even though pre-1972 sound recordings are not protected by federal copyright law,16 it
is important to understand the scope of federal rights in recordings that are protected. This
background will facilitate the comparison between the scope of protection under state and
federal law for sound recordings, and illustrate how the regime of protection would change
for pre-1972 recordings if they were brought under federal copyright law. It also serves to
11. Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). The law was passed on October 15, 1971, and went into
eﬀect four months later, on February 15, 1972.
12. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012).
13. See id. § 301(c).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) currently states:
With respect to sound recordings ﬁxed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common
law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067. The preemptive provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to any such rights and remedies pertaining to any cause of action
arising from undertakings commenced on and after February 15, 2067. Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 303, no sound recording ﬁxed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to copyright under this title
before, on, or after February 15, 2067.
As passed in 1976, the legislation provided that state laws would not be preempted until February 15, 2047,
but that date was extended to February 15, 2067 by the Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
Title I, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
15. See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298.
16. Certain foreign pre-1972 sound recordings are protected under federal copyright law as a result of the
1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4973-81. To comply with U.S.
treaty obligations, that law restored federal copyright protection in certain foreign works that were in the public
domain for lack of compliance with U.S. formalities such as copyright notice and renewal. It also provided
protection for certain foreign sound recordings still protected in their home countries, even though the recordings would not have been entitled to federal copyright protection had they had been published in the United
States in the ﬁrst instance. Restoration occurred automatically on January 1, 1996 for most works. 17 U.S.C. §
104A(h)(2) (2002). Restored works are protected for the remainder of the term they would have been granted
had they not entered the public domain.

136

IP THEORY

Volume 5: Issue 1

illustrate the diﬀerences between state law protection for pre-1972 sound recordings and the
federal copyright protection available to the works – for example, musical compositions or
literary works – that underlie those recordings.
A. Rights Provided by Copyright.
In general, copyright consists of a “bundle” of rights, including:
1. The reproduction right (the right to make copies and phonorecords). 17
A copyright owner can decide whether or not to make copies or license others to do
so, and on what terms. 18 A copy of a sound recording is known as a “phonorecord,”19 but
because the state courts do not use this terminology, this article will refer to reproductions
of sound recordings as copies.
2. The right to create adaptations (also known as “derivative works”).20
Sound recordings have a narrower “derivative work” right than do other copyrighted
works. Merely imitating the sounds in a recording does not infringe the original. The
derivative work is infringing only if it contains actual sounds from the protected work.21
3. The right to distribute copies of the work to the public.22
This right is limited by the “ﬁrst sale doctrine” which provides that the owner of a
particular copy of a copyrighted work that was lawfully made may sell or otherwise transfer
that copy without the authority of the copyright owner.23
4. The right to perform the work publicly.24
Performing a work “publicly” means to perform it anywhere that is open to the public or
anywhere that a “substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its
social acquaintances is gathered.”25 Transmitting the performance or display to such a place
also makes it public, regardless of whether members of the public receive the performance
17. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1) (2002).
18. Sound recordings have an exclusive reproduction right like most other works; musical compositions, in
contrast, are subject to a statutory license in respect to their reproduction and distribution after the initial recording of the composition. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
20. See id. §106(2).
21. See id. § 114(b) (2010).
22. See id. § 106(3).
23. See id. § 109(a) (2008).
24. See id. § 106(4).
25. See id. § 101.
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at the same time or diﬀerent times, at the same place or diﬀerent places.26 For example, a
radio broadcast is a public performance, even if each member of the audience listens to it in
her own home. Transmitting performances or displays of a copyrighted work to the public
over the Internet is a public performance or display of the work.27
Sound recording copyright owners have a narrower right of public performance than
do those of other works; speciﬁcally, they have the right “to perform the work publicly by
means of a digital audio transmission,” as described below.28 Analog transmission is not
restricted by copyright.29 In broad brush, the law sets up a three-tiered system of protection
for performances of sound recordings.30 The ﬁrst tier consists of certain types of public
performances that are exempt from the performance right and may be made for free, such
as “live” performances of sound recordings at public venues (such as discos) and analog
transmissions.31
The second tier encompasses certain digital audio transmissions subject to a compulsory
license. The sound recording copyright owner may not prevent these public performances,
but the transmitting party must pay royalties to the sound recording copyright owner and
performers at the rate set by the Copyright Royalty Board.32

26. Id.
27. See ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
29. Many bills have been introduced in Congress to require terrestrial broadcasters to pay performance royalties to artists and record companies, but so far none has been successful. See, e.g., Performance Rights Act,
S. 2500, 110th Cong. (2007) and H.R. 4789, 110th Cong. (2007).
30. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336, amended by Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2899 (1998) (codiﬁed
at 17 U.S.C. § 114).
31. Also included in this ﬁrst tier are traditional AM and FM broadcasts, public radio, background music services, and performances and transmissions in business establishments such as stores and restaurants. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106(6), 114(b), (d)(1). Although use of the sound recording may be free, it may still be necessary to pay
license fees for the underlying work.
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2). Those royalties are distributed to recording companies and performers by an
organization called SoundExchange. The performances in the “second tier” include subscription digital transmissions (i.e., those limited to paying recipients) and certain eligible nonsubscription digital transmissions. A
transmission may be made pursuant to the compulsory license if it (a) is not in the ﬁrst tier (in which case a
license is unnecessary because it is exempt), (b) is accompanied, if feasible, with the title, name of copyright
owner and other information concerning the sound recording and underlying musical work, and (c) the transmitting party meets a number of speciﬁc statutory requirements that diminish the risk that the transmissions
will be copied or will substitute for having copies, e.g., it does not publish its program in advance, does not
play more than a speciﬁed number of selections by a particular performer or from a particular phonorecord
within a speciﬁed time period, does not seek to evade these conditions by causing receivers to automatically
switch program channels, etc. See also R
C
, U.S. C
O
,C
M
M
56 (Feb. 2015), available at http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-marketplace.pdf
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Finally, the third tier consists of certain digital audio transmissions that fall neither
under the exemption (ﬁrst tier) nor the compulsory license (second tier) and thus require
negotiating a license with the copyright owner. These are performances such as interactive
digital audio services (on-demand streaming).33
5. The right to display the work publicly.34
The owner of a lawfully made copy is entitled to display the work publicly to viewers
present where the copy is located.35
Copyright Exceptions. The Copyright Act contains many exceptions and limitations to
the rights outlined above, spelled out largely in sections 107 to 122 of the Act. Among those
exceptions are fair use,36 exceptions for libraries and archives under certain circumstances to
copy works in their collections for their own use (for preservation or replacement) or upon
the request of a user,37 and
educational exceptions for face-to-face classroom use and distance education.38
Term of Protection. The duration of copyright protection in the United States diﬀers
depending on when the work was created and published. For works ﬁrst created on or after
January 1, 1978 (the eﬀective date of the 1976 Copyright Act), copyright lasts for the life of
the author plus seventy years.39 For anonymous and pseudonymous works and works made
for hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation (whichever expires
ﬁrst).40 Works created but not published before January 1, 1978 were given the same term as
works created on or after January 1, 1978.41
For works ﬁrst published prior to January 1, 1978, the rules are complicated, but
33. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(2), (3), (4)(A). This category also includes nonsubscription transmissions that
do not meet the conditions for the compulsory license (second tier) because, for example, the transmitting party publishes the program in advance, or does not abide by the limitations concerning the number of selections
from a particular phonorecord or performer that can be played in a speciﬁed time period.
34. See id. § 106(5).
35. See id. § 109(c). The display may be direct or “by the projection of no more than one image at a time.”
The display right is not of particular relevance to sound recordings.
36. See id. § 107 (1992).
37. See id. § 108 (2005).
38. See id § 110(1), (2) (2005).
39. See id. § 302(a) (1998).
40. See id. § 302(c). A “work made for hire” is a work created by an employee in the course of his or her
employment, or a commissioned work where the commissioning party and the creator agree in a signed writing that the product will be a work make for hire. Only certain categories of works are eligible to be commissioned works made for hire. 17 U.S.C. §101.
41. See id. § 303(a) (2010). All works created but still unpublished at January 1, 1978, no matter how old,
were protected under federal copyright law until at least December 31, 2002. If the work was published between January 1, 1978 and December 31, 2002, its term of protection will not end until December 31, 2047.
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speciﬁcally with respect to sound recordings, those published from 1972-77 are protected
for 95 years from publication.42

IV. P

S

R

U

S

L

Pre-1972 sound recordings are governed by a patchwork of laws that vary in nature and
scope from state to state.43 Almost all states have criminal laws that prohibit the reproduction
and public distribution of these recordings.44 On the civil side, some states have civil statutes
speciﬁcally aimed at unlawful use of pre-1972 sound recordings.45 Others rely on common
law torts: “common law copyright,” unfair competition, misappropriation and the like.46 In
some states, there have been no reported decisions addressing civil protection for pre-1972
sound recordings, so it is hard to predict how suits will be resolved other than by relying on
general principles of unfair competition.47
A 2005 decision in New York, Capitol Records v. Naxos, demonstrated the potential
breadth of state law protection for sound recordings.48 The case involved recordings made
abroad that had fallen into the public domain in their home country. Plaintiﬀ claimed those
recordings nevertheless remained protected under New York state law. The New York Court
of Appeals, the highest court in New York, agreed. It held that in New York, such recordings
are covered by “common law copyright” rather than by unfair competition or another tort.
This holding was signiﬁcant because common law copyright is a broader form of
protection. Unfair competition or misappropriation sometimes require a competitive injury
or bad faith (there is some variation from state to state), but the New York Court of Appeals
made clear that neither was a requirement for infringement of common law copyright.49
This holding raised particular concerns for libraries and archives seeking to preserve pre1972 sound recordings and make them available for research or study, because without the
requirements of intent or bad faith, it is possible for nonproﬁt users to be liable.
42. See id.
43. See Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at 20-49.
44. Id. at 20-28.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 30-43.
47. June M. Besek, Copyright and Related Issues Relevant to Digital Preservation and Dissemination of Unpublished Pre-1972 Sound Recordings by Libraries and Archives 37-39 (CLIR and Library of Congress 2009).
States may protect unpublished sound recordings under common law copyright, even if they impose a diﬀerent
regime of protection on published sound recordings. Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property,
Washington College of Law, American University (under the supervision of Peter Jaszi with the assistance of
Nick Lewis), Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Under State Law and Its Impact on Use by Nonproﬁt
Institutions: A 10-State Analysis 15-16 (CLIR and Library of Congress 2009) [hereinafter Jaszi Report].
48. Capitol Records, Inc., v. Naxos of America, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).
49. Id. at 266.
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V. C

F

S

P

50

A. Rights.
Most reported state cases deal with unauthorized commercial duplication and distribution
of sound recordings; it is apparent that these rights are recognized under state law.51 There is
some support for the existence of a derivative work right under state law, but too few cases
to establish whether it can be considered similar in scope to the derivative work right under
federal law.52
In general, states do not appear to recognize a right of public performance in pre-1972
sound recordings,53 and a few states restrict such a right by statute.54 Such recordings are
regularly played, broadcast and streamed without a performing rights license.55 Federally
protected sound recordings were accorded a right of public performance only in 1995, and
then only with respect to certain digital audio transmissions.56
Both federal and state-protected sound recordings continue to be performed on the radio
and live without payment, but federal law provides compensation for sound recording
owners for Internet streaming.57 Owners of pre-1972 sound recordings would like to be
similarly compensated. Recently several lawsuits have been brought against Pandora and
Sirius XM, seeking to establish a requirement under the laws of various states that those
entities pay for streaming pre-1972 sound recordings.58
50. This article merely highlights the principal diﬀerences that might bear on the takings issues. A detailed
comparison between state and federal law protection is beyond the scope of this article.
51. See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 341 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1975); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Ct. App. 1969).
52. For example, in Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, the New York Court of Appeals rejected
Naxos’s claim that its remastering of the Capitol recordings to enhance sound quality resulted in “new products” that did not infringe the originals, since the remastered recordings still utilized elements of the original
recordings. Supra, note 48, at 267.
53. See, e.g., RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1940). But see Flo & Eddie Inc. v.
Sirius XM Radio Inc., CV 13-5693 PSG (RZx), 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), discussed infra.
54. E.g., N.C. G . S . A . § 66-28 (W
2014); S.C. C
A . § 39-3-510 (1962).
55. See U.S. C
O
,T
P -1972 S
R
P
M
167-68
(June 2, 2011) (comments of David Oxenford), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/meeting/
transcript-06-02-2011.pdf; see generally Comments of Sirius XM Radio in response to Copyright Oﬃce Notice of Inquiry on Federal Copyright Protection of Sound Recordings Fixed Before Feb. 15, 1972, Docket No.
2010-4 (Apr. 13, 2011), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/sound/comments/reply/.
56. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995);
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 111, 119, 801-03 (2006).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f) (2012).
58. E.g., SoundExchange, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 1:13CV1290 (RJL), 2014 WL 4219591 (D.D.C.
Aug. 26, 2014) (alleging that Sirius withheld from SoundExchange royalties owed for the performance of pre1972 sound recordings, in violation of §§ 112 and 114 of the Copyright Act).
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In the ﬁrst such case to be decided, Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., a federal
district court in California held that California provides a full right of public performance
for pre-1972 sound recordings.59 That ruling will be discussed further in section VIII, infra.

B. Exceptions.
Most reported state decisions concerning pre-1972 sound recordings addressed wide
scale commercial copying and distribution. It is often not clear what other exceptions
and limitations may be available under the various state laws because few cases address
commercial, transformative uses or noncommercial uses.60 It seems reasonable to assume
that state courts would apply fair use in appropriate circumstances, since the exception
developed at common law61 accommodates First Amendment and other concerns. New
York explicitly recognized a fair use defense as applied to the use of a pre-1972 sound
recording.62 There are no established state common law doctrines analogous to other federal
law exceptions, such as § 110(2) for distance education, or §108 for library and archive uses.
On the other hand, in many states noncommercial activities such as uses for scholarship,
teaching, preservation and so on would simply not meet the criteria for a cause of action
under state law, since there is no commercial beneﬁt to the user.63

C. Term of protection.
Under federal law, the term of protection for any given work depends on when the
work was created or published; as indicated above, the general rule for term of protection
of works created prior to 1978 is 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation,
whichever expires ﬁrst.64 States are entitled – but not required – to protect pre-1972 sound
recordings until 2067. A few states provide for a speciﬁc end date before 2067 for such
protection, but most do not.65 States are entitled to protect all pre-1972 sound recordings,
no matter how old, until 2067. They are not required by federal law to move them into the
public domain prior to that date. So while a musical composition published in 1922 went
59. Flo & Eddie, supra note 53.
60. The California civil statute has exceptions, as do many state criminal laws, but they do not cover the
range of uses for which exceptions are available under federal law. See Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2,
at 26-28.
61. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
62. See EMI Records Ltd. v. Premise Media Corp., No. 601209/08, 2008 WL 5027245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug.
8, 2008).
63. See Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at 27; Jaszi Report, supra note 47, at 10-11.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a).
65. California, for example, protects sound recordings only until February 15, 2047. C . C . C
§ 980(a)
(2) (West 1982). Colorado law provides that for the purposes of criminal enforcement, a common-law copyright
may not last longer than 56 years from when it accrues. C
. R . S . A . §18-4-601 (1.5) (2009). See
generally Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at 47. 2067 is eﬀectively the end date in the many states that
protect sound recordings pursuant to common law causes of action, for which claims there is often no speciﬁc
end date under state law.
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into the public domain in 1997, a sound recording published the same year can be protected
under state law until 2067.66

VI. T

C

O

R

Archivists and scholars, increasingly concerned about preservation of and access to
pre-1972 sound recordings, have urged that pre-1972 sound recordings be brought under
federal copyright law.67 They are concerned that the ambiguity of state law, coupled with the
lengthy term of protection – potentially until 2067 – are impairing their ability to preserve
these older recordings and make them available for study. In 2009, Congress charged
the U.S. Copyright Oﬃce with studying whether pre-1972 sound recordings should be
brought under federal law, and evaluating (i) the possible implications of such a change on
preservation of and access to sound recordings, and (ii) the potential economic impact on
right holders.68 The Oﬃce’s study took more than two years; its report, Federal Protection
for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, was issued in December 2011. 69 In the report, the Oﬃce
concluded that the best course is for Congress to federalize protection for pre-1972
recordings.
According to the Copyright Oﬃce, federalization “would best serve the interest of
libraries, archives and others in preserving old sound recordings and increasing the
availability to the public of old sound recordings.”70 Acknowledging that the scope of
existing federal copyright exceptions is not always clear, the Oﬃce nonetheless decided
that as a general matter, federal law would provide greater certainty and more opportunity
to preserve old sound recordings and make them available to the public than the current
patchwork of state laws does.71 In the Oﬃce’s view, the objections raised by the opponents
of federalization could be satisfactorily addressed by drafting the legislation appropriately.72
Speciﬁcally, the Copyright Oﬃce recommended that:73
66. See Capitol Records, Inc., supra note 48. Many states base protection on common law unfair competition principles, which have no temporal endpoint (other than the externally imposed federal preemption deadline of 2067), but protection would eﬀectively cease if the sound recording at issue had no commercial value,
so for any given recording, the term may eﬀectively be shorter than 2067.
67. See, e.g., Association for Recorded Sound Collections, Legal Impediments to Preservation of and Access to the Audio Heritage of the United States: Recommendations by the Association for Recorded Sound
Collections and the Music Library Association (Nov. 2, 2007), http://www.arsc-audio.org/pdf/ARSC-MLAcopyright.pdf.
68. See Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at vii. See also L
C
,N
I
,
F
C
P
S
R
F
B
F
15, 1972, 75 F . R .
67777 (N . 3, 2010).
69. See Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at vii-4.
70. Id. at viii.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at ix-x.
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- Pre-1972 sound recordings should be brought under federal copyright law and given the
same rights, exceptions and limitations as sound recordings created in 1972 and thereafter.
- The initial owner of the federal copyright should be the person who owns the rights in
the recording under state law just prior to when the federal law becomes eﬀective, so that
federalization would not change ownership.
- The term of protection for the newly-federalized recordings would be 95 years from
publication or, if the work is unpublished at the time of federalization, 120 years from
ﬁxation.74 No pre-1972 sound recording would be protected beyond February 15, 2067. 75
- In cases where the federal term of protection would result in expiration of the copyright
term prior to February 15, 2067, the following mechanisms would permit copyright owners
to achieve a longer period of federal protection:
For sound recordings published in 1923 or later (or that have never been published at
all), there would be a “transition period” of 6-10 years from the enactment of federal
protection, during which the right holder would have to (i) make the sound recording
available to the public at a reasonable price, and (ii) ﬁle a notice in the Copyright Oﬃce
to verify it has done so and state its intent to achieve maximum protection. Provided the
right holder (iii) continues to make the work available at a reasonable price, protection
would last until February 15, 2067. (These requirements shall be referred to hereafter as
the “extended term requirements.”)
For sound recordings published prior to 1923, the Report proposes a shorter transition
period—three years from the enactment of federalizing legislation—during which a right
holder would need to comply with extended term requirements. If the extended term
requirements were met, the work could be protected for 25 years from enactment of the
federalizing legislation. Otherwise, protection would expire at the end of the three-year
transition period.
- Finally, the Report recognized that adjustments should be considered with respect to
the various federal requirements, e.g., timely registration as a prerequisite to an award of
attorney’s fees and statutory damages in an infringement suit; 17 U.S.C. section 205, which
deals with priority of conﬂicting transfers; and other provisions.

VII. T

P

T

I

One looming issue is whether bringing state-protected sound recordings under federal law
74. Id. at 165-66. The Oﬃce did not recommend a term that relied on a measuring life, due to the collaborative nature of sound recordings and the diﬃculty, after many years, of determining length of protection based
on one or more measuring lives.
75. Id.
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could amount to a “taking” of private property or a violation of due process rights under
the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.76 This issue could arise in various ways, but the
greatest risk of such a claim in the scheme proposed by the Copyright Oﬃce deals with (1)
who would own the newly federalized sound recordings and (2) the term of protection under
federal law for such recordings.77

A. Ownership.
With respect to ownership, the concern is that in some cases the owner of the sound
recording under state law might be diﬀerent than it would have been had the work been
protected by federal copyright from the outset, and that federalization might therefore eﬀect
a change in ownership. If federalization were to result in a transfer of ownership, that could
be problematic.
It is true that the laws regarding ownership and transfers of rights in sound recordings
may diﬀer between state and federal law. For example, under federal copyright law, where
a work qualiﬁes as a work made for hire, it is the hiring party and not the individual creator
who is the author for purposes of copyright law.78 The scope of the work made for hire
doctrine under federal law has varied over time. The extent to which any particular state
would recognize a work made for hire doctrine equivalent to that of federal law at the
relevant time with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings is unclear; often there are no cases
on point. Accordingly, it is at least possible that in some cases the state law would hold that
the hiring party is the owner and the federal law would hold that the human creators are the
owners, or vice versa.
Current federal copyright law makes clear that owning a physical copy of a copyright
protected work is distinct from owning the underlying intellectual property rights.
Transferring a copy – even if it is the only copy, or the best copy – also does not convey the
underlying rights without an agreement. 79 In some states, however, the owner of the master
recording might be deemed the owner of rights in the sound recording.80
76. See Fifth Amendment, supra note 3.
77. For a more detailed discussion of the potential constitutional issues, see Eva E. Subotnik & June M.
Besek, Constitutional Obstacles? Reconsidering Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 37
C
. J. L. & A
327 (2014); Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at 155-62.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (b) (1978). For an explanation of work made for hire. Federal law prior to 1978
also had a work made for hire doctrine, but it was more broadly applicable, see note 40, supra. For a detailed
discussion of the work made for hire doctrine, see 1 M
B. N
&D
N
,N
C , § 5.03 [A], § 5.03 [B][1][ ][ ] (2014)
79. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (1976).
80. See, e.g., Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., Inc., 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 (N.Y. 1942) (“[A]n artist must,
if he wishes to retain or protect the reproduction right, make some reservation of that right when he sells the
painting”). The “Pushman doctrine” was repudiated by statute in New York and California, at least for works
of ﬁne art. See 3 N
C
, supra note 78, § 10.09 [B][1], [B][2]. A state court might apply this
principle to pre-1972 sound recording masters.
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So while it is far from certain, the application of federal law rather than state law to
determine ownership of pre-1972 sound recordings could eﬀect a change in ownership,
upsetting existing business expectations. This potential problem could be avoided, however,
if federalizing legislation were to explicitly provide that the legislation does not eﬀect a
change in ownership, and the initial owner of the federal copyright in these recordings
should be determined by state law, as should the validity of any transfers made prior to the
eﬀective date of the legislation, as the Copyright Oﬃce Report recommends.81

B. Term of Protection.
Any shortening of the term of protection by virtue of the transfer from state to federal
law also has the potential to raise takings or due process claims. In the Copyright Oﬃce
proposal, all pre-1972 sound recordings would get a term of protection of 95 years from
publication; for unpublished works, 120 years from creation. For all sound recordings
except those published prior to 1923, if the term would expire before 2067, the recording
would nevertheless get at least 6-10 years of federal protection, and be eligible for federal
protection until 2067 if the extended term requirements are met. In the context of real
property, the Supreme Court has held that imposing conditions for maintaining rights is
permissible, so it would seem that this scheme responds to taking concerns.82
The Copyright Oﬃce’s proposal for works ﬁrst published prior to 1923 diﬀers, however,
in that those works would not be eligible for protection until 2067. Those recordings would
be eligible for a minimum of three years protection, and if the extended term requirements
were met, they could get a maximum of 25 years of protection. Assuming that the legislation
became eﬀective on January 1, 2016, those recordings could be protected only until the end
of 2040: they would lose 27 years of protection. However, given the age of those recordings
(published before 1923), the fact that the vast majority likely have no commercial value,
and the amount of time they have already enjoyed copyright protection, a successful takings
claim seems remote.
Another set of concerns about federalizing legislation relates to potential retroactivity.
Such concerns arise where a law “attaches new legal consequences to conduct that took
place prior to the law’s enactment.”83 Carefully drafting the legislation could eliminate any
reasonable possibility of such claims. Congress could minimize any potential retroactive
eﬀect by making clear that federalization would have no eﬀect on ownership; any
termination provisions under federal law are applicable only to post-federalization grants;84
81. See Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at 139-49.
82. See, e.g., Subotnik & Besek, supra note 77, at 367-71.
83. Id. at 344.
84. See Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at ix. Federal law provides that a grant of copyright rights
made by an author on or after Jan. 1, 1978 may be terminated after 35 years, to allow the author or her heirs to
renegotiate a grant that may have been made when the value of the work was not known. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)
(2002). Certain grants with respect to works published prior to January 1, 1978 can be terminated under diﬀer-
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any claims concerning pre-1972 recordings existing at the time of federalization would
be resolved under state law; and federal law applies only to post-federalization activities.
Congress took this approach when it folded unpublished works protected by state law
into federal copyright in 1976. Section 301 states that nothing in the federal copyright law
annuls or limits state law rights or remedies with respect to “any cause of action arising
from undertakings commenced before January 1, 1978.”85
In short, it does appear possible for Congress to federalize pre-1972 sound recordings
without violating constitutional rights.

VIII. R

D

Since the Copyright Oﬃce Report was issued, a couple of bills concerning pre-1972
sound recordings have been introduced in Congress, but neither has passed.86 The issue
was raised in hearings on music licensing conducted by the Subcommittee on Courts,
Intellectual Property and the Internet of the House Committee on the Judiciary as part of its
overall copyright review. So far the Subcommittee has not indicated which copyright issues
it intends to focus on.
The Copyright Oﬃce, meanwhile, has undertaken an in-depth study of music licensing;
its Notice of Inquiry speciﬁcally addressed pre-1972 sound recordings, among other
things.87 In the summer of 2014 the Oﬃce conducted a series of roundtable discussions on
the issues raised by its Notice of Inquiry. The discussions provide helpful insight into why
some stakeholders oppose federalizing pre-1972 sound recordings.
Participants in the roundtable discussions had various positions with respect to
federalization of pre-1972 sound recordings. The predominant ones were: (1) there should
be full federalization; (2) because full federalization would raise complicated issues
that could only be worked out over time, the U.S. should pass legislation bringing pre1972 sound recordings into the section 114 statutory license, and deal with the rest of the

ent conditions. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c), (d) (2002).
85. 17 U.S.C. §301 (b)(2). See Golan v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 6800 at *50 (D. Colo. 2005) (holding URAA Section 514 not retroactive because though the provision “grants many retroactive beneﬁts to authors, it does not impose retroactive burdens upon the plaintiﬀs. This is because Section 514 does not impose
upon the plaintiﬀs liability for, or new duties as a result of, their past conduct. Nor does Section 514 impair
rights that the plaintiﬀs possessed when they acted. In short, Section 514 does not alter the legal consequences
of the plaintiﬀs’ completed acts.” (citations omitted)).
86. E.g., RESPECT Act, H.R. 4772, 113th Cong. (2d Sess. 2014) (to require that digital music services
pay for the use of pre-1972 sound recordings in the same manner as they pay for sound recordings protected
by federal copyright law); Sound Recording Simpliﬁcation Act, H.R. 2933, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) (to
amend the Copyright Act to allow Congress to legislate with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings).
87. See U.S. Copyright Oﬃce, Library of Congress, Music Licensing Study: Notice and Request for Public
Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 14739, 14742 (2014).
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federalization issues at some later time;88 or (3) federalizing pre-1972 sound recordings in
the Copyright Act, or even just including them in the section 114 statutory license, is unfair;
it would provide their creators with a windfall at the expense of those who stream digital
music.

A. Full Federalization
A number of discussants at the Copyright Oﬃce’s music licensing roundtables argued
for full federalization.89 There is no question that federalizing pre-1972 recordings raises
some diﬃcult issues. They will not all be enumerated here; they are discussed at length
in the Copyright Oﬃce’s study on pre-1972 sound recordings.90 The Oﬃce concluded,
nevertheless, that these issues are “not insurmountable,”91 a conclusion with which I
concur. For example, diﬃcult problems could arise if the federalization worked a change in
ownership. However, if, as the Oﬃce suggests, the federalizing legislation were to provide
that the owner of rights under federal law would be the owner under state law on the day
before the federalizing legislation becomes eﬀective, those issues would largely be avoided.
On January 1, 1978, countless unpublished works were brought under federal copyright
law pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 301, with relatively few problems. Admittedly there are
additional issues that pertain to published works, but it is possible to work through them so
that the goal of achieving a unitary copyright system is achieved and the stakeholders are
fairly treated.92

B. The U.S. Should Pass Legislation Bringing Pre-1972 Sound Recordings into the
Section 114 Statutory License Now, and Deal With the Rest of the Federalization
Issues Later.
Some discussants argued in favor of dealing with the section 114 license now, and the
other aspects of federalization later.93 There are at least two problems with this approach.
First, it appears to recognize a federal law right without corresponding exceptions. The
Copyright Oﬃce Report was eﬀectively initiated by libraries and archives that seek greater
88. This is the approach of the RESPECT Act, supra note 86.
89. E.g., U.S. C
O
,T
M
L
S
P
R
165-67
(June 17, 2014) (comments of Eric Harbeson); 162-64 (comments of Ilene Goldberg), available at http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/transcripts/mls-la-transcript06172014.pdf.
90. See generally Copyright Oﬃce Report, supra note 2, at 139-74.
91. Id. at viii.
92. See generally Subotnik & Besek, supra note 77.
93. E.g., U.S. C
O
,T
M
L
S
P
R
149-50
(June 5, 2014) [hereinafter Public Roundtable June 5] (comments of Dean Marks) available at http://copyright.
gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/transcripts/mls-nashville-transcript06052014.pdf; U.S. C
O
,
T
M
L
S
P
R
172-73 (June 24, 2014) [hereinafter Public
Roundtable June 24] (comments of Colin Rushing), available at http://copyright.gov/docs/musiclicensingstudy/transcripts/mls-nyc-transcript06242014.pdf. .
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clarity in governing laws in order to better achieve preservation and scholarly uses of
pre-1972 sound recordings. The “114 only” approach is aimed primarily at commercial
recordings, and does little to respond to the legitimate concerns of libraries and archives.
Second, it is not clear that the complications of full federalization can be avoided by this
route. For example, doesn’t one still have to determine ownership under this approach?
Moreover, it would not obviate questions about termination rights, takings or the like.

C. Federalization Would Create a Windfall for Creators.
Some discussants argued that including pre-1972 sound recordings in the Copyright Act,
and in particular, in the section 114 statutory license, would provide their creators with a
windfall.94
It is true that creators of pre-1972 sound recordings had no expectation of a performance
right in digital audio transmissions when they created their works. At the same time, they
did have an expectation of continuing to earn revenue from sales of copies (phonorecords)
of their sound recordings. The market has changed in a way that few if any persons could
have envisioned; increasingly, sound recordings are exploited through digital streaming
rather than through distribution of copies. Accordingly, allowing the creators to beneﬁt from
the streaming of their recordings is not a windfall.
Some discussants also argued that the creators of pre-1972 sound recordings should not
beneﬁt from this new market because it could not have acted as an incentive to the creation
of these recordings.95 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this “quid pro quo” theory in
Eldred v. Ashcroft.96 Moreover, the beneﬁts of full federalization along the lines proposed by
the Copyright Oﬃce in its report would accrue not only, or even primarily, to right holders
of pre-1972 sound recordings, but also to scholars, researchers, libraries, archives and other
users of these recordings.
Since the music licensing roundtable discussions, there has been a state law case that
will likely lead to greater disarray in the laws governing pre-1972 sound recordings. In Flo
& Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., the federal district court for the Central District of
California concluded that California state law provided a public performance right in sound
recordings created by “The Turtles” in the 1960s.97 It held that Sirius XM violated plaintiﬀs’
rights under state law by transmitting the Turtles’ recordings over its satellite and internet
radio services.98
94. E.g., Public Roundtable June 24, supra note 93, at 174-75 (comments of Bruce Rich); Public Roundtable
June 5, supra note 93, at 170 (comments of David Oxenford).
95. E.g., Public Roundtable June 24, supra note 93, at 175-76 (comments of Bruce Rich); Public Roundtable June 5, supra note 93, at 169-70 (comments of David Oxenford).
96. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214-17 (2003).
97. Flo & Eddie, supra note 53.
98. The court held that Sirius XM’s transmissions violated Cal. Civ. Code §980(a)(2) (West 1982) as well

IP THEORY

Volume 5: Issue 1

149

The court recognized a full public performance right that apparently would permit sound
recording owners to enforce against non-digital performances, such as those by radio
stations’ terrestrial broadcasts. It never directly addressed the fact that since the time sound
recordings were commercially exploited until the present, music industry stakeholders have
been conducting themselves as though no such right exists. According to the court, the issue
of whether there is a state law public performance right for pre-1972 sound recordings had
never been squarely presented to a California court before.99
This ruling, which recognizes a state law performance right that exceeds the scope of
federal rights in sound recordings, will certainly create controversy and is likely to be
appealed. Owners of federally protected sound recordings have repeatedly sought to extend
the public performance right in sound recording to terrestrial broadcasts, but broadcasters
have been ﬁrm in their opposition. This holding will undoubtedly be appealed, but if it
stands it could lead to greater support for incorporating pre-1972 sound recordings into
federal copyright law from terrestrial broadcasters and from users who seek relief from the
increasingly confusing array of state laws.

C
Pre-1972 sound recordings are currently protected by a patchwork of state laws.
Legislation to make all pre-1972 recordings subject to federal copyright law (including the
section 114 statutory license) would eliminate the disparate sources of protection for these
recordings and the necessity to consult the inconsistent and sometimes hard to discern state
laws to determine whether pre-1972 sound recordings may permissibly be used. At the
same time, it would reduce the disparate treatment of domestic pre-1972 sound recordings
and foreign pre-1972 sound recordings whose U.S. copyrights have been restored.100
Federalization would enable archiving and other scholarly research and use that is
currently hampered by the lack of discernable, consistent exceptions among the states, as
well as terms of protection under state law that can extend until 2067. One of goals of those
who sought the sound recording study was to be able to preserve and provide access to old
recordings.
Finally, federalization of pre-1972 sound recordings would reduce confusion. One cannot
always readily determine if a particular recording is protected by state law, by federal
copyright law as a restored work, or by federal copyright law as a protected derivative work.
Federalizing pre-1972 sound recordings raises some tricky issues, but those issues can be
overcome by careful drafting, in particular to ensure that federalization does not eﬀect a
as Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (West 1992) (unfair competition and common law misappropriation). It declined to rule on summary judgment as to whether Sirius XM made infringing reproductions.
99. Flo & Eddie, supra note 53, at *15.
100. See supra note 16.
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